The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. First, players choose their acts dependent on certain information variables, and second there are constraints on the sets of decisions for players. After the derivation of a general (Nash)equilibrium existence theorem, some results from purification theory are used to prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, that is in nonrandomized decision functions. For some types of payoff-functions and constraints, these games prove to have an (exact) equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason for considering constrained games with incomplete information is that, apart from their game-theoretic importance, they have rather widespread application. Market games with a continuum of traders as well as some statistical decision problems are covered with this approach.
- ISBN10 3642502792
- ISBN13 9783642502798
- Publish Date 21 October 1987
- Publish Status Withdrawn
- Out of Print 18 October 2014
- Publish Country US
- Imprint Springer My Copy UK
- Format Paperback (US Trade)
- Pages 140
- Language English