Cambridge Studies in International Relations
2 total works
In this book, Professor Nicholson outlines social scientific approaches to international relations and then describes the problems of rational decision-making in conflict situations. He shows how rationality is in many strategic situations hard to define and often leads to paradoxes such as the prisoners' dilemma. In the following part the author explores rational beliefs about the international system. He examines theories of arms races, alliances and the international problems of ecology. Here he is critical of the classical school of international relations for a lack of rigour in dealing with the problems of evidence and belief. Finally, Michael Nicholson discusses the philosophy of science, policy and ethics. This book is both an exposition and a defence of a social scientific approach to international relations. With its emphasis on social scientific approaches, theory building and testing - and above all its clarity and accessibility - it provides students with a key to understanding the complex field of conflict analysis.
This book, first published in 1989, gives a critical account of formal international relations theory. That formal and mathematical methods can be applied to the study of international relations is often regarded with surprise, but the author demonstrates not only how these methods give insights into problems such as deterrence or arms races but also that the increase in the power of explanatory tools depends on the more rigourous development of theory along these lines. Mathematical methods have been applied to the study of international behaviour since the pioneering work of Lewis Fry Richardson in the 1920s and 1930s. However, it was in the post Second World War period that they became widespread. Dr Nicholson discusses the application of such methods as the theory of games to problems of relationships between states, catastrophe theory to the study of initiation of violence, and probability theory to the question of the probability of nuclear war.