Osprey Campaign S.

3 primary works

St Nazaire 1942

by Ken Ford

Published 24 October 2001

The raid on the port of St Nazaire in March 1942 by a sea-borne task force from British Combined Operations remains one of the most impressive actions of World War II. The port lies at the mouth of the River Loire, and in 1942 as well as a U-boat base it contained the massive "Normandie" dock. Originally built for the pre-war construction of the giant Atlantic liner of the same name, the "Normandie" dock was the only facility on the Atlantic coast large enough to accommodate the German twin battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz. This volume tells the full story of the raid on St Nazaire, a raid that would deny the use of the dock to the Tirpitz, and which constituted a vital step in the Battle of the Atlantic.

D-Day 1944 (4)

by Ken Ford

Published 17 July 2002

The beaches codenamed Gold and Juno constituted the western section of the British sector of the landings. This title explores the D-Day objectives for the troops landing on these two beaches, which included the capture of the town of Arromanches. They were also tasked with the capture of Bayeux and securing the coast road between Bayeux and Caen. The British 50th Division supported by 8th Armoured Brigade successfully fought their way off Gold, whilst the Canadians on Juno has a tougher time. It could not however prevent the linking of Gold, Juno and Sword on 7 June securing the British beachhead. The breakout could now begin.

Dieppe 1942

by Ken Ford

Published 12 June 2003

The Dieppe raid of August 1942 is one of the most controversial actions of World War II. Operation Jubilee was a frontal assault on a fortified port landing the latest equipment and armor directly on to the beach. The main force would destroy the port facilities while other smaller landings dealt with anti-aircraft and coastal batteries. The raid itself turned into a fiasco. The assault force was pinned down on the beach and three quarters of the 5,000 troops landed were lost. This book analyses the disastrous raid and examines contrasting conclusions drawn by the Allies and the Germans.

There is no doubt that the raid in force on Dieppe in August 1942 was one of the most controversial episodes of the Second World War. The Allied loss of life and numbers of prisoners taken, especially amongst the Canadians, led to much recrimination and not a little heated argument. On the face of it the raid was an unmitigated disaster, with virtually none of the objectives achieved. From its outset the plan was seriously flawed, but the momentum to open at least a symbolic second front to help the struggling Russians overruled more sober analysis. Enemy resistance along the shoreline succeeded in pinning down the invading forces, destroying the best part of them while they were still aboard their landing craft or as they tried to get off the beaches. It is now fashionable to see the raid as a rehearsal for D-Day and some justification for the great loss of life is claimed by the many lessons that were learned from the debacle regarding combined operations. Indeed, the military establishment would have had to been incompetent not to have learned anything from such a foul-up, and these lessons did contribute to the success of the Normandy invasion.