This report seeks to clarify the stated objectives of the US rebalance strategy, reviewing regional responses, and assessing the status of the rebalance, which is critical to reinforcing regional stability by strengthening US relationships, presence, and capabilities. The authors evaluate both public statements and visible implementation of the rebalance strategy, as viewed not only from Washington but from regional capitals as well.

This report is the first regional study in the CSIS Federated Defense series. The Federated Defense Project aims to shift the paradigm with key allies and partners from capacity building to a federated approach that would expand regional security and prosperity by joining regional allies and partners together in the pursuit of shared security objectives across the conflict spectrum. Federated defense should include forward-thinking strategies for how to develop and share capabilities and capacity, thereby more deeply integrating the US military with its allies and partners. In this report, the CSIS project team highlights six potential federated initiatives in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, information and intelligence sharing, maritime security, undersea warfare, missile defense, and cyber security. Federated approaches such as these are vital to developing and integrating Asian security capabilities to manage emerging security challenges.

The United States is being confronted by the liabilities of its strength. Competitors are finding avenues for threatening U.S. interests without triggering escalation. Their approaches lie in the contested arena between routine statecraft and open warfare-the "gray zone." The United States has yet to articulate a comprehensive approach to deterring competitors in the gray zone. A concrete and actionable campaign plan is needed to deal with the gray zone challenge; in order to do so, the United States must identify and employ a broad spectrum of tools and concepts to deter, and if needed, to compete and win contestations in the gray zone.

Is Japan capable of grand strategy when it comes to foreign policy? Modern Japan faces challenges on every front: from a rising China and constrained economic growth at home, to an ever-present threat posed by an increasingly unstable North Korea, to an evolving and complex relationship with the West that for so long has served as the bedrock of Japanese foreign policy. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has garnered significant attention for his policies undergirding a path of "proactive pacifism" for Japan, but many questions remain unanswered with regard to what Japan's global role ought to be, what it can be, and what that role's development would mean for the greater stability of the region and the fate of broader geopolitical alliances across the world. While it is clear that both Japan and its allies would be best served by a clear, comprehensive, and forward-thinking Japanese foreign policy blueprint, but actually developing and implementing such a policy is understandably easier said than done.

Fortunately, shaping this new strategy is a generation of Japanese foreign policy experts with eyes toward the future of Japanese power and diplomacy. In Strategic Japan: New Approaches to Foreign Policy and the U.S. Japan Alliance, five preeminent scholars: Yasuhiro Matsuda, Tetsuo Kotani, Hiroyasu Akutsu, Yoshikazu Kobayashi, and Nobuhiro Aizawa discuss Japan's changing role in the world and the high stakes policy issues affecting Japan, Asia, and the world today. Taken together, these experts' contributions highlight potential areas for enhanced cooperation between the United States and Japan at a time when the West desperately needs a confident and proactive Japan, and Japan needs sustained American engagement and deterrence in an Asia-Pacific region that will continue to be the site of economic growth and expansion for years to come.



This study examines the potential for a "federated defense" approach to U.S. action in the Middle East, the constraints to closer military cooperation in the region, and specific capability areas that would benefit from federated defense. Stabilizing the Middle East requires continued attention and investment from the United States and its global allies and partners. Federated defense involves building partner capabilities in a way that shares the burden of providing security in a more effective and efficient manner. Federated defense would, over time, create partner capabilities that augment and complement U.S. capabilities. Doing so requires identifying discrete areas of cooperation between the United States and its allies and partners that would leverage partner capabilities in pursuing common security objectives.

In this report, the CSIS International Security Program analyzes Russian undersea intentions and capabilities in the near to mid-term and the ability of NATO and partner nations to respond effectively. The assessment identifies gaps in current Western organizations, capabilities, and posture and offers recommendations as to how NATO and partner nations can meet the Russian challenge in the undersea domain.

Investments in amphibious capabilities by U.S. partners and allies in the Asia Pacific is altering the range of capabilities available in that region. It is also changing the types and frequency of exercises partner nations seek to undertake with the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps team. This study examines ally- and partner-nation investments in amphibious capabilities, how those capabilities will impact demand for U.S. forces, and the range of U.S. amphibious fleet composites to meet the changing demand.

In the past decade, tensions in Asia have risen as Beijing has become more assertive in maritime disputes with its neighbors and the United States. Although taking place below the threshold of direct military confrontation, China's assertiveness frequently involves coercive elements that put at risk existing rules and norms; physical control of disputed waters and territory; and the credibility of U.S. security commitments. Regional leaders have expressed increasing alarm that such "gray zone" coercion threatens to destabilize the region by increasing the risk of conflict and undermining the rules-based order. Yet, the United States and its allies and partners have struggled to develop effective counters to China's maritime coercion. This study reviews deterrence literature and nine case studies of coercion to develop recommendations for how the United States and its allies and partners could counter gray zone activity.

Surprise has always been an element of warfare, but the return of great power competition-and the high-level threat that it poses-gives urgency to thinking about surprise now. Because the future is highly uncertain, and great powers have not fought each other for over 70 years, surprise is highly likely in a future great power conflict. This study, therefore, examines potential surprises in a great power conflict, particularly in a conflict's initial stages when the interaction of adversaries' technologies, prewar plans, and military doctrines first becomes manifest. It is not an attempt to project the future. Rather, it seeks to do the opposite: explore the range of possible future conflicts to see where surprises might lurk.

This report assesses domestic political support for internationalist foreign policy by analyzing the motivations of members of Congress on key foreign policy issues. It includes case studies on major foreign policy debates in recent years, including the use of force, foreign aid, trade policy and U.S.-Russia relations. It also develops a new series of archetypes for describing the foreign policy worldviews of members of the 115th Congress to replace the current stale and unsophisticated labels of internationalist, isolationist, hawk and dove. Report findings emphasize areas of bipartisan cooperation on foreign policy issues given member ideologies.




The U.S.-India relationship has fluctuated from mutual suspicion to the current high-water mark of cooperation embodied in the seemingly close relationship between U.S. president Barack Obama and Indian prime minister Narendra Modi. This study seeks to identify the opportunities to deepen security cooperation between the two counties, while ensuring continued effort to reduce the obstacles and impediments in each system to working with the other.

The Department of Defense (DOD) faces a strategic choice: whether to focus on modernization for high-tech conflicts with China and Russia or expand forces and improve readiness to meet a superpower's commitments for ongoing conflicts and crisis response. In their FY 2018 budgets, the services all complain that they are too small for the demands being put on them and hedge toward expanding forces and readiness. In the new DOD strategy being developed for 2019 and beyond, the services hope to pursue all three goals-expand forces, improve readiness, and increase modernization-but the fiscal future is highly uncertain, and they will likely have to make difficult trade-offs.

Tell Me How This Ends

by Mark F. Cancian

Published 17 September 2019
When the United States invaded Afghanistan after the attacks on September 11, 2001, and then overthrew the Taliban regime, senior military officers were not predicting that the United States would be militarily involved 18 years later. Yet, after expending nearly $800 billion and suffering over 2,400 killed, the United States is still there, having achieved at best a stalemate. This CSIS report concludes that the mission in Afghanistan expanded from a limited focus on counterterrorism to a broad nation-building effort without discussions about the implications for the duration and intensity of the military campaign. This expansion occurred without considering the history of Afghanistan, the Soviet experience, and the decades-long effort required in successful nation-building efforts. The report makes a series of recommendations: improving the dialogue between senior military and civilian officials about desired goals/end states and the implied intensity/duration of a military campaign; continuing the development of military strategists; revising military doctrine publications to include discussion of choices about goals/end states; and taking more seriously the history and experience of others.