Modern War Studies
14 total works
By the time Pearl Harbour had ripped apart America's peacetime pretensions, the German blitzkrieg had already blasted the Red Army back to the gates of Moscow. Yet, less than four years later, the Soviet hammer-and-sickle flew above the ruins of Berlin, stark symbol of a miraculous comeback that destroyed the German army and shattered Hitler's imperial designs. Told in swift stirring prose, "When Titans Clashed" provides an account of this epic struggle from the "Soviet" perspective. David Glantz, one of the foremost authorities on the Soviet military, and Jonathan House present a fundamentally new interpretation of what the Russians called the "Great Patriotic War". Based on unprecedented access to formerly classified Soviet sources, they counter the German perspective that has dominated previous accounts and radically revise our understanding of the Soviet experience during World War II. Placing the war within its wider political, economic and social contexts, the authors recount how the determined Soviets overcame their initial disasters to defeat the invading German army.
As they show, this truly was war waged on a titanic scale, sweeping across a half-million square miles from Moscow to Berlin, featuring monumental offensives and counter-offensives, and ultimately costing both sides combined a staggering 40,000,000 casualties. Their work offers new revelations on Soviet strategy and tactics, Stalin's role as supreme commander of the Red Army, the emergence of innovative and courageous commanders in the crucible of combat, numerous previously concealed or neglected military operations, German miscalculations on the road to the Red capital, the effect of D-Day and the "second front" on the Soviet effort, and the war's devastating impact on the Soviet economy and civilian population.
As they show, this truly was war waged on a titanic scale, sweeping across a half-million square miles from Moscow to Berlin, featuring monumental offensives and counter-offensives, and ultimately costing both sides combined a staggering 40,000,000 casualties. Their work offers new revelations on Soviet strategy and tactics, Stalin's role as supreme commander of the Red Army, the emergence of innovative and courageous commanders in the crucible of combat, numerous previously concealed or neglected military operations, German miscalculations on the road to the Red capital, the effect of D-Day and the "second front" on the Soviet effort, and the war's devastating impact on the Soviet economy and civilian population.
Endgame at Stalingrad: The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 3
by David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House
Published 14 March 2014
The campaign intended to secure the Wehrmacht's flanks had proven one front too many for the German Army. And now the offensive at Stalingrad, the epic clash that marked Germany's failure on the Eastern Front, was entering its grim final phase. In Book One of the third volume of his acclaimed Stalingrad Trilogy, David Glantz offers the definitive account--the ""ground truth"" to counter a half-century's worth of myth and misinformation- of the beginning of the end of one of the most infamous battles of the Second World War, and one of the most costly in lives and treasure in the annals of history.
When Volume Two left off, Germany's vaunted Sixth Army, already deflected from its original goal-the Caucasus oil fields- had been drawn into a desperate war of attrition within the ravaged city of Stalingrad. In Volume Three, Book One, we see the ultimate consequences of the Germans' overreach and the gathering force of the Red Army's massive manpower and increasingly sophisticated command. After failing repeatedly to find and exploit the weaknesses in Axis defenses, Stalin and the Stavka (High Command) finally seized their chance in mid-November of 1942 by launching a bold and devastating counteroffensive, Operation Uranus.
Glantz draws a detailed and vivid account of how, in Operation Uranus, the Red Army's three fronts defeated and largely destroyed two Romanian armies and encircled the German Sixth Army and half of the German Fourth Panzer Army in the Stalingrad pocket-turning the Germans' world on its head. Like its predecessor volumes, this one makes extensive use of sources previously out of reach or presumed lost, such as reports from the Sixth Army's combat journal and newly released Soviet and Russian records. These materials (many cited at length or printed in their entirety in a companion volume) lend themselves to a strikingly new interpretation of the campaign's planning and execution on both sides-a version of events that once and for all gets at the ground truth of this historic confrontation.
When Volume Two left off, Germany's vaunted Sixth Army, already deflected from its original goal-the Caucasus oil fields- had been drawn into a desperate war of attrition within the ravaged city of Stalingrad. In Volume Three, Book One, we see the ultimate consequences of the Germans' overreach and the gathering force of the Red Army's massive manpower and increasingly sophisticated command. After failing repeatedly to find and exploit the weaknesses in Axis defenses, Stalin and the Stavka (High Command) finally seized their chance in mid-November of 1942 by launching a bold and devastating counteroffensive, Operation Uranus.
Glantz draws a detailed and vivid account of how, in Operation Uranus, the Red Army's three fronts defeated and largely destroyed two Romanian armies and encircled the German Sixth Army and half of the German Fourth Panzer Army in the Stalingrad pocket-turning the Germans' world on its head. Like its predecessor volumes, this one makes extensive use of sources previously out of reach or presumed lost, such as reports from the Sixth Army's combat journal and newly released Soviet and Russian records. These materials (many cited at length or printed in their entirety in a companion volume) lend themselves to a strikingly new interpretation of the campaign's planning and execution on both sides-a version of events that once and for all gets at the ground truth of this historic confrontation.
In Endgame at Stalingrad, the final volume of his acclaimed Stalingrad Trilogy, David Glantz completes his definitive account of one of World War II's most infamous confrontations, the campaign that marked Germany's failure on the Eastern Front and proved to be a turning point in the war. In documenting the last days of the Stalingrad campaign, in particular the Red Army's counteroffensive known at Operation Uranus, Glantz takes on a plethora of myths and controversial questions surrounding these events, in particular, questions about why Operation Uranus succeeded and the German relief attempts failed, whether the Sixth Army could have escaped encirclement or been rescued, and who, finally was most responsible for its ultimate defeat.
In addition to a wide variety of traditional sources, this volume makes use of two major categories of documentary materials hitherto unavailable to researchers. The first consists of extensive records from the combat journal of the German Sixth Army, which had been largely missing since the war's end and were only recently rediscovered and published. The second is a vast amount of newly released Soviet and Russian archival material including excerpts from the Red Army General Staff's daily operational summaries; a wide variety of Stavka (High Command), People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO), and Red Army General Staff orders and directives; and the daily records of the Soviet 62nd Army and its subordinate divisions and brigades for most of the time fighting was underway in Stalingrad proper.
Because of the persistent controversy and mythology characterizing this period, many of these documents are included verbatim in English translation in this companion volume, providing concrete evidence in support of the conclusions put forward in Volume Three. As such, the Companion contributes substantially to this final volume's unprecedented detail and fresh perspectives, interpretations, and evaluations of the later stages of the Stalingrad campaign.
In addition to a wide variety of traditional sources, this volume makes use of two major categories of documentary materials hitherto unavailable to researchers. The first consists of extensive records from the combat journal of the German Sixth Army, which had been largely missing since the war's end and were only recently rediscovered and published. The second is a vast amount of newly released Soviet and Russian archival material including excerpts from the Red Army General Staff's daily operational summaries; a wide variety of Stavka (High Command), People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO), and Red Army General Staff orders and directives; and the daily records of the Soviet 62nd Army and its subordinate divisions and brigades for most of the time fighting was underway in Stalingrad proper.
Because of the persistent controversy and mythology characterizing this period, many of these documents are included verbatim in English translation in this companion volume, providing concrete evidence in support of the conclusions put forward in Volume Three. As such, the Companion contributes substantially to this final volume's unprecedented detail and fresh perspectives, interpretations, and evaluations of the later stages of the Stalingrad campaign.
Germany's surprise attack on June 22, 1941, shocked a Soviet Union woefully unprepared to defend itself. The day before the attack, the Red Army still comprised the world's largest fighting force. But by the end of the year, 4,500,000 of its soldiers lay dead. This study based on formerly classified Soviet archival material and neglected German sources, reveals the truth behind this national catastrophe. David Glantz claims that in 1941 the Red Army was poorly trained, inadequately equipped, ineptly organized, and consequently incapable of engaging in large-scale military campaigns - and that both Hitler and Stalin knew it. He provides reasons for why the Soviets almost lost the war that summer, dispelling many of the myths about the Red Army that have persisted since the war and refuting Viktor Suvonov's controversial thesis that Stalin was planning a pre-emptive strike against Germany. ""Stumbling Colossus"" describes the Red Army's command leadership, mobilization and war planning, intelligence activities, and active and reserve combat formations. It includes a complete Order of Battle of Soviet forces on the eve of the German attack, documents the strength of Soviet armoured forces during the war's initial period, and reproduces texts of actual Soviet war plans. It also provides biographical sketches of Soviet officers and explains how Stalin's purges of the late 1930s left the Red Army almost decimated.
Tantor Audio presents the complete audio version of the long-awaited one-volume campaign history from the leading experts of the decisive clash of Nazi and Soviet forces at Stalingrad.
Stalingrad is an abridged edition of the five-volume Stalingrad Trilogy.
Stalingrad is an abridged edition of the five-volume Stalingrad Trilogy.
Armageddon in Stalingrad Volume 2 The Stalingrad Trilogy
by David M. Glantz
Published 23 November 2009
The German offensive on Stalingrad was originally intended to secure the Wehrmacht's flanks, but it stalled dramatically in the face of Stalin's order: ""Not a Step Back!"" The Soviets' resulting tenacious defense of the city led to urban warfare for which the Germans were totally unprepared, depriving them of their accustomed maneuverability, overwhelming artillery fire, and air support-and setting the stage for debacle.
Armageddon in Stalingrad continues David Glantz and Jonathan House's bold new look at this most iconic military campaign of the Eastern Front and Hitler's first great strategic defeat. While the first volume in their trilogy described battles that took the German army to the gates of Stalingrad, this next one focuses on the inferno of combat that decimated the city itself.
Previous accounts of the battle are far less accurate, having relied on Soviet military memoirs plagued by error and cloaked in secrecy. Glantz and House have plumbed previously unexploited sources-including the archives of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the records of the Soviet 62nd and German Sixth Armies-to provide unprecedented detail and fresh interpretations of this apocalyptic campaign. They allow the authors to reconstruct the fighting hour by hour, street by street, and even building by building and reveal how Soviet defenders established killing zones throughout the city and repeatedly ambushed German spearheads.
The authors set these accounts of action within the contexts of decisions made by Hitler and Stalin, their high commands, and generals on the ground and of the larger war on the Eastern Front. They show the Germans weaker than has been supposed, losing what had become a war of attrition that forced them to employ fewer and greener troops to make up for earlier losses and to conduct war on an ever-lengthening logistics line.
Written with the narrative force of a great war novel, this new volume supersedes all previous accounts and forms the centerpiece of the Stalingrad Trilogy, with the upcoming final volume focusing on the Red Army's counteroffensive.
Armageddon in Stalingrad continues David Glantz and Jonathan House's bold new look at this most iconic military campaign of the Eastern Front and Hitler's first great strategic defeat. While the first volume in their trilogy described battles that took the German army to the gates of Stalingrad, this next one focuses on the inferno of combat that decimated the city itself.
Previous accounts of the battle are far less accurate, having relied on Soviet military memoirs plagued by error and cloaked in secrecy. Glantz and House have plumbed previously unexploited sources-including the archives of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the records of the Soviet 62nd and German Sixth Armies-to provide unprecedented detail and fresh interpretations of this apocalyptic campaign. They allow the authors to reconstruct the fighting hour by hour, street by street, and even building by building and reveal how Soviet defenders established killing zones throughout the city and repeatedly ambushed German spearheads.
The authors set these accounts of action within the contexts of decisions made by Hitler and Stalin, their high commands, and generals on the ground and of the larger war on the Eastern Front. They show the Germans weaker than has been supposed, losing what had become a war of attrition that forced them to employ fewer and greener troops to make up for earlier losses and to conduct war on an ever-lengthening logistics line.
Written with the narrative force of a great war novel, this new volume supersedes all previous accounts and forms the centerpiece of the Stalingrad Trilogy, with the upcoming final volume focusing on the Red Army's counteroffensive.
One of the least known stories of World War II, Operation Mars was a military disaster on an epic scale. Designed to dislodge the German Army from its position west of Moscow, it cost the Soviets an estimated 335,000 dead, missing and wounded men and over 1,600 tanks. But in Russian history books, it was a battle that never happened. It became instead another victim of Stalin's postwar censorship. This book offers an account of this forgotten catastrophe, revealing the key players and detailing the major events of Operation Mars. Using sources in both German and Russian archives, he reconstructs the historical context of Mars and reviews the entire operation from High Command to platoon level. Orchestrated and led by Marshal Georgy Kostantinovich Zhukov, one of the Soviet Union's great military heroes, the twin operations Mars and Uranus formed the centrepiece of Soviet strategic efforts in the fall of 1942. Launched in tandem with Operation Uranus, the successful counteroffensive at Stalingrad, Mars proved a monumental setback. Fought in bad weather and on impossible terrain, the ambitious offensive faltered (despite spectacular initial success in some sectors).
Zhukov kept sending in more troops and tanks only to see them decimiated by the entrenched Germans. Illuminating the painful progress of Operation Mars with battle scenes and numerous maps and illustrations, Glantz presents Mars as a major failure of Zhukov's renowned command. Yet, both during and after the war, that failure was masked from public view by the successful Stalingrad operation, thus eliminating any stain from Zhukov's public image as a hero of the Great Patriotic War. For three gruelling weeks, Operation Mars was one of the most tragic and agonizing episodes in Soviet military history, Glantz's reconstructon of that failed offensive should fills a gap in our knowledge of World War II, even as it raises important questions about the reputations of national military heroes.
Zhukov kept sending in more troops and tanks only to see them decimiated by the entrenched Germans. Illuminating the painful progress of Operation Mars with battle scenes and numerous maps and illustrations, Glantz presents Mars as a major failure of Zhukov's renowned command. Yet, both during and after the war, that failure was masked from public view by the successful Stalingrad operation, thus eliminating any stain from Zhukov's public image as a hero of the Great Patriotic War. For three gruelling weeks, Operation Mars was one of the most tragic and agonizing episodes in Soviet military history, Glantz's reconstructon of that failed offensive should fills a gap in our knowledge of World War II, even as it raises important questions about the reputations of national military heroes.
A study of the Battle of Kursk (at Prokhorovka), one of the largest tank engagements in world history, which led to staggering losses - imncluding nearly 200,000 Soviet and 50,000 German casualties within the first ten days of fighting. Drawing on both German and Soviet sources, David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House seek to separate myth from fact to show what really happened at Kursk and how it affected the outcome of World War II. Their access to Soviet archive material adds detail to what is known about this conflict, enabling them to reconstruct events from both perspectives and describe combat down to the tactical level. The volume takes readers behind Soviet lines to reveal what the Red Army knew about the plans for Hitler's offensive (Operation Citadel), relive tank warfare and hand-to-hand combat, and tell how the tide of battle turned. Glantz and House's interpretations demolish many of the myths that suggest Hitler might have triumphed if Operation Citadel had been conducted differently. They also provide figures of combat strengths and losses, along with 32 maps that clarify troop and tank movements.
The German seige and Soviet defense of Leningrad in World War II was an epic struggle in an epic war, a drama of heroism and human misery unmatched in the annals of modern warfare. This work provides a military history of the conflict waged beyond the city's borders. One of the first major Soviet cities threatened by the German Blitzkrieg, Leningrad was as much a symbolic target as it was a strategic one for Adolf Hitler, who fully expected the birthplace of the Russian Revolution to be reduced to rubble quickly and with ease. The Red Army's ferocious defense of the city, however, made that impossible. The text covers the full story of how these two military giants bludgeoned each other for nearly three years with a relentless barrage of offensives and counter-offensives designed to crush one another, in horrendous weather and a harsh terrain and with staggering loss of life on both sides. It shows how battles and campaigns were conceived, engaged and resolved - including a half dozen or more ""forgotten battles"" that took place during the blockade.
For centuries, the world has witnessed the development and use of increasingly complex and powerful military systems and technologies. In the process, the ""art of war"" has truly become the art of combined arms warfare, in which infantry, artillery, air support, intelligence, and other key elements are all coordinated for maximum effect. Nowhere has this trend been more visible than in the history of twentieth-century warfare. This title covers among other things Desert Storm, the war in Chechnya, and the rise of ""smart weapons"" and related technologies. It traces the evolution of tactics, weapons, and organization in five major militaries, American, British, German, Russian, and French, over 100 years of warfare. Revealing both continuities and contrasts within and between these fighting forces, he also provides illuminating glimpses of Israeli and Japanese contributions to combined arms doctrine. Expanding his analysis of the world wars and the wars in Korea and Vietnam, House also offers much new material focused on the post-Vietnam period. Throughout, he analyzes such issues as command-and-control, problems of highly centralized organizations, the development of special operations forces, advances in weapons technology- including ballistic and anti-ballistic missile systems- the trade-offs involved in using ""heavy"" versus ""light"" armed forces, and the enduring obstacles to effective cooperation between air and land forces.
To the Gates of Stalingrad Volume 1 The Stalingrad Trilogy
by David M. Glantz
Published 21 April 2009
The confrontation between German and Soviet forces at Stalingrad was a titanic clash of armies on an unprecedented scale-a campaign that was both a turning point in World War II and a lasting symbol of that war's power and devastation. Yet despite the attention lavished on this epic battle by historians, much about it has been greatly misunderstood or hidden from view-as David Glantz, the world's foremost authority on the Red Army in World War II, now shows.
This first volume in Glantz's masterly trilogy draws on previously unseen or neglected sources to provide the definitive account of the opening phase of this iconic Eastern Front campaign. Glantz has combed daily official records from both sides-including the Red Army General Staff, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the German Sixth Army, and the Soviet 62nd Army-to produce a work of unparalleled detail and fresh interpretations. Jonathan House, an authority on twentieth-century warfare, adds further insight and context.
Hitler's original objective was not Stalingrad but the Caucasus oilfields to the south of the city. So he divided his Army Group South into two parts-one to secure the city on his flank, one to capture the oilfields. Glantz reveals for the first time how Stalin, in response, demanded that the Red Army stand and fight rather than withdraw, leading to the numerous little-known combat engagements that seriously eroded the Wehrmacht's strength before it even reached Stalingrad. He shows that, although advancing German forces essentially destroyed the armies of the Soviet Southwestern and Southern Fronts, the Soviets resisted the German advance much more vigorously than has been thought through constant counterattacks, ultimately halting the German offensive at the gates of Stalingrad.
This fresh, eye-opening account and the subsequent companion volumes-on the actual battle for the city itself and the successful Soviet counteroffensive that followed-will dramatically revise and expand our understanding of what remains a military campaign for the ages.
This first volume in Glantz's masterly trilogy draws on previously unseen or neglected sources to provide the definitive account of the opening phase of this iconic Eastern Front campaign. Glantz has combed daily official records from both sides-including the Red Army General Staff, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the German Sixth Army, and the Soviet 62nd Army-to produce a work of unparalleled detail and fresh interpretations. Jonathan House, an authority on twentieth-century warfare, adds further insight and context.
Hitler's original objective was not Stalingrad but the Caucasus oilfields to the south of the city. So he divided his Army Group South into two parts-one to secure the city on his flank, one to capture the oilfields. Glantz reveals for the first time how Stalin, in response, demanded that the Red Army stand and fight rather than withdraw, leading to the numerous little-known combat engagements that seriously eroded the Wehrmacht's strength before it even reached Stalingrad. He shows that, although advancing German forces essentially destroyed the armies of the Soviet Southwestern and Southern Fronts, the Soviets resisted the German advance much more vigorously than has been thought through constant counterattacks, ultimately halting the German offensive at the gates of Stalingrad.
This fresh, eye-opening account and the subsequent companion volumes-on the actual battle for the city itself and the successful Soviet counteroffensive that followed-will dramatically revise and expand our understanding of what remains a military campaign for the ages.
A volume for Glantzophiles and anyone else who would like a richer and more complete documentary and statistical foundation for Colossus Reborn. Its contents include key documents relating to the every-day lives of the Red Army's soldiers, a full roster of the senior command cadre during wartime, a description of the army's weaponry and equipment, and an exhaustively detailed listing of the Red Army's and NKVD's order of battle at six crucial points from June 22, 1941, through December 31, 1943.
Continuing his magisterial account of the Eastern Front campaigns, the writer cited by The Atlantic as "indisputably the West's foremost expert on the subject" focuses here on the Red Army's operations from the fall of 1943 through the April 1944. David M. Glantz chronicles the Soviet Army's efforts to further exploit their post-Kursk gains and accelerate a counteroffensive that would eventually take them all the way to Berlin.
The Red Army's Operation Bagration that liberated Belorussia in June 1944 sits like a colossus in the annals of World War II history. What is little noted in the history books, however, is that the Bagration offensive was not the Soviets' first attempt. Battle for Belorussia tells the story of how, eight months earlier, and acting under the direction of Stalin and his Stavka, three Red Army fronts conducted multiple simultaneous and successive operations along a nearly 400-mile front in an effort to liberate Belorussia and capture Minsk, its capital city. The campaign, with over 700,000 casualties, was a Red Army failure.
Glantz describes in detail the series of offensives, with their markedly different and ultimately disappointing results, that, contrary to later accounts, effectively shifted Stalin's focus to the Ukraine as a more manageable theater of military operations. Restoring the first Belorussian offensive to its place in history, this work also reveals for the first time what the later, successful Bagration operation owed to its forgotten precursor.
The Red Army's Operation Bagration that liberated Belorussia in June 1944 sits like a colossus in the annals of World War II history. What is little noted in the history books, however, is that the Bagration offensive was not the Soviets' first attempt. Battle for Belorussia tells the story of how, eight months earlier, and acting under the direction of Stalin and his Stavka, three Red Army fronts conducted multiple simultaneous and successive operations along a nearly 400-mile front in an effort to liberate Belorussia and capture Minsk, its capital city. The campaign, with over 700,000 casualties, was a Red Army failure.
Glantz describes in detail the series of offensives, with their markedly different and ultimately disappointing results, that, contrary to later accounts, effectively shifted Stalin's focus to the Ukraine as a more manageable theater of military operations. Restoring the first Belorussian offensive to its place in history, this work also reveals for the first time what the later, successful Bagration operation owed to its forgotten precursor.
Germany's Eastern Front in World War II saw many campaigns and battles that have been ""forgotten"" by a Soviet Union that tried to hide its military failures. The Red Army's invasion of Romania in April and May 1944 was one such campaign, which produced nearly 200,000 casualties and tarnished the reputations of its commanders. The redoubtable David Glantz, the world's leading authority on the Soviet military in World War II, now restores this tale to its proper place in the annals of World War II. Working from newly available Russian and long-neglected German archives - plus Red Army unit histories and commanders' memoirs - Glantz reconstructs an imposing mosaic that reveals the immense scope and ambitious intent of the first Iasi-Kishinev offensive. His re-creation shows that Stalin was not as preoccupied with a direct route to Berlin as he was with a ""broad front"" strategy designed to gain territory and find vulnerable points in Germany's extended lines of defense. If successful, the invasion would have also eliminated Romania as Germany's ally, cut off the vital Ploiesti oilfields, and provided a base from which to consolidate Soviet power throughout the Balkans. Glantz discloses General Ivan Konev's strategic plan as the 2nd Ukrainian Front prepared its Iasi offensive and fought a climactic battle with the German Eighth Army and its Romanian allies in the Tirgu-Frumos region in early May, then the regrouping of General Rodion Malinovsky's 3rd Ukranian Front for its decisive offensive toward Kishinev, which aborted in the face of a skillful counterstroke by a threadbare German Sixth Army. Glantz describes how the Wehrmacht, with a nucleus of combat veterans, was able to beat back Soviet forces hampered by spring floods, while already fragile Soviet logistical support was further undermined by the Wehrmacht's scorched-earth strategy. Although Konev's and Malinovsky's offensives failed, the Red Army managed to inflict heavy losses on Axis forces, exacerbating the effects of Germany's defeats in the Ukraine and making it more difficult for the Wehrmacht to contain the Soviet juggernaut's ultimate advance toward Berlin.