This book examines the changing role of Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGSs) as a financial safety net of the European Union, with specific emphasis on post-crisis reforms. The author identifies the institutional weaknesses of DGSs and analyses their functioning in post-crisis conditions. Readers discover the extent to which the participation of DGSs in bank resolution increases effectiveness, and whether such enhancement of the financial safety net allows for the liquidation of large financial institutions. Finally, the book identifies, categorises, and analyses possible forms of involvement of DGSs in the EU resolution, as well as the proposal of methods for the quantitative measurement of the preparedness of DGSs to participate in this process.


This book explores the diversity of restructuring instruments applied to financial institutions in EU countries during the Global Financial Crisis. It investigates the cost of that support before evaluating its effects, as well as providing an extensive analysis of the measures undertaken. The first chapter presents a historical outline, discusses causes of crises, and offers an overview of the restructuring instruments and of how they were used for crisis management before 2007. The following chapters explore the financial environment in the EU before the crisis outbreak, the rescue actions and financial landscape after the events of the crisis. This book offers a critical and thorough analysis of the financial support provided to banks, providing case studies of over 95 banks from 17 EU member states. The authors provide an in-depth study of the pre and post-crisis landscape, and demonstrate that the crisis has by no means been overcome.