This analysis of the war includes examination of IDF and Hezbollah doctrine, as well as an overview of the operational and tactical problems encountered by the IDF. The author argues that the Israeli reliance on poorly understood and controversial Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and Systemic Operational Design (SOD) warfighting theories, and a nearly singular dependence on air power, were root causes of Israeli problems. Additionally, after years of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank territories, IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and untrained to fight against a determined Hezbollah force that conducted what was, in many ways, a conventional, fixed-position defense. In researching this study, Mr. Matthews interviewed several prominent IDF officers and other experts in the field. Originally published by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
- ISBN10 1692885278
- ISBN13 9781692885274
- Publish Date 13 September 2019 (first published 25 March 2008)
- Publish Status Unknown
- Imprint Independently Published
- Format Paperback (US Trade)
- Pages 106
- Language English