This book analyses and develops overarching concepts for forest policy and forest governance and includes a detailed investigation into the historical discussion on forests. It examines opportunities and limits for negative emissions in a sector that – like peatlands – appears significantly less ambivalent compared to highly technical large-scale forms of climate geoengineering. The analysis shows that the binding climate and biodiversity targets under international law are much more ambitious than most people assume. Measured against that, the volume critically reviews the potentials of afforestation and reforestation for climate mitigation, which is often presented as the new saviour to fulfil the commitments of the Paris Agreement and to reach climate neutrality in the future. It becomes clear that ultimately only biodiverse and thus resilient forests can function as a carbon sink in the long term. The volume shows that the existing European and international forest governance approaches fail to comply with these targets and insights. Furthermore, the book develops a bundle of policy measures. Quantity governance systems for livestock farming, fossil fuels and similar drivers of deforestations represent the most important approach. They are most effective when not directly targeting forests due to their heterogeneity but central damaging factors. With regard to the dominant regulatory and subsidy-based governance for forests we show that it remains necessary to supplement these quantity governance systems with certain easily graspable and thus controllable regulatory and subsidy regulations such as a regulatory protection of old-growth forests with almost no exceptions; extension of the livestock-to-land-ratio established in organic farming to all farming; far-reaching restriction of bioenergy use to certain residues flanked by import bans; and a national and international complete conversion of all agricultural and forest subsidies to “public money for public services” to promote nature conservation and afforestation in addition to the quantity control systems.


With cost-benefit analysis, economic sciences cultivate a specific decision-making procedure, which has also been partially adopted in politics. Although economists do not experience the approach as normative, on closer examination the approach can be identified as an economic ethics. The present philosophical and at the same time transdisciplinary (with special legal and economic components) treatment examines the persuasive power of this approach using climate change as an example, as the most important sustainability issue. The objections raised against the economisation of decision-making with regard to the utilitarian tradition, such as the criticism of the orientation towards weighing up options, the alleged lack of distributive justice or the tendency to describe people in behavioural science as selfish, are hardly or not at all convincing on closer examination. In several respects, however, it turns out that cost-benefit analysis faces insoluble problems. Firstly, the theoretical basis of (hidden normative) cost-benefit analysis in philosophical empiricism does not seem tenable. This means the idea of empiricism that normative questions must be transformed into questions of factual (countable and reproduceable) preferences of people. Secondly, there are massive collisions of cost-benefit analysis with a liberal-democratic constitutional law, whose principles are universal ethical principles. This concerns both freedom rights (which must not depend on the ability of humans to pay) and the model of democracy and respect for the rule of law. Thirdly, insoluble problems of application arise for cost-benefit analyses, which are particularly (but not only) apparent in the context of climate protection, in general considerations as in the case of legislation as well as in individual analyses, as done when constructing a coal-fired power plant. A strongly deflated cost-benefit analysis could nevertheless contribute factual material – such as partial aspects of decision consequences that can actually be depicted in monetary terms – to ethical or legal decision-making processes. In this respect the approach appears helpful and complementary, but not beyond that.