This study explores the growing competition for scarce dollars at the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA). It traces the authorities, roles, and missions assigned to the agency and the growing trend of using what was originally intended to be a research and development budget for procurement and sustainment of missile defense assets. As adversary missile arsenals develop in both size and sophistication, continued improvements to our current missile defense systems will be required to keep pace with the threat. The combination of an ever shrinking top line and new roles and missions being assigned to MDA make that task difficult. Finding a new path forward and more clearly defining the position of the agency inside the Department of Defense will be essential for a more sustainable missile defense posture.

For decades, the United States has led the effort to stem the spread of nuclear weapons, both among potential adversaries and among its allies and partners. The current state of deterrence and of the nonproliferation regime, however, is open to many doubts. What happens if the nonproliferation regime should break down altogether? What happens if extended deterrence should fail, and allies no longer believe in the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella? What happens when the world has not 9 but 11, 15, 18, or even more nuclear powers? This study explores how such a world might function and what it would mean for our present conceptions of deterrence, for the place of the United States in the international order, and for international order itself.

Distributed Defense

by Thomas Karako and Wes Rumbaugh

Published 29 December 2017
Despite the rising salience of missile threats, current air and missile defense forces are far too susceptible to suppression. Today's U.S. air and missile defense (AMD) force lacks the depth, capacity, and operational flexibility to simultaneously perform both missions. Discussions about improving AMD usually revolve around improvements to the capability and capacity of interceptors or sensors. Rather than simply doing more of the same, the joint integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) efforts might be well served by new or reinvigorated operational concepts, here discussed collectively as "Distributed Defense." By leveraging networked integration, Distributed Defense envisions a more flexible and more dispersible air and missile defense force capable of imposing costs and dilemmas on an adversary, complicating the suppression of U.S. air and missile defenses. Although capability and capacity improvements remain essential to the high-end threats, the Distributed Defense concept focuses on creating a new architecture for today's fielded or soon-to-be fielded IAMD force to boost flexibility and resilience.

While free trade agreements and other intermediary trade agreements allow emerging nations increased access to markets, many low- and middle-income countries lack the capacity required to meet global standards. Deficiencies in quality of product, speed of transport, or quality of regulation can prevent countries from reaping the benefits of trade agreements, particularly with the United States. This report of the CSIS Congressional Task Force on Trade Capacity Building-cochaired by Representatives Charles Boustany (R-LA) and Jared Polis (D-CO)-focuses on how projects to build trade capacity can be planned and coordinated to maximize the benefits of new trade agreements, both for the United States and its partners.

CSIS undertook a study in support of Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Strategy and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to explore using U.S. military power in new ways to achieve high-priority strategic ends (derived from the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance). The project was informed by a series of in-depth interviews and a Core Working Group with experts from outside the U.S. government, including former government officials, current foreign government uniformed and civilian defense officials, global business strategists, and individuals knowledgeable in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

This report defines a set of strategy options, each with associated capabilities, gleaned from other leading think tank reports as well as the study team's analysis. The report identifies capability priorities for the 2021 and beyond security environment and recommends a force structure for a 2021 affordable military.

This report focuses on the ways that a federated defense approach can strengthen strategic partnerships and deliver more innovative defense technologies at a lower cost-by better harnessing global supply chain networks to expand the military supplier base and increase the net capability available to the network of partners and allies.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) is a provision in Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and other international investment agreements that allows investors to enter arbitration with states over treaty breaches. ISDS has become controversial in the United States and our negotiating partners; critics, including some governments, have argued that ISDS is unnecessary, while others insist it is illegitimate as public policy. Treaty-based investment protection represents a major advance in the fair treatment of aliens and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Given the alternatives, withdrawing from investment treaties-the logical conclusion of the critics' position-would likely have negative consequences for economic growth and the rule of law. This report is an empirical review of ISDS, based on the record of disputes under existing investment treaties.

Project Atom is a forward-looking, "blue-sky" review of U.S. nuclear strategy and posture in a 2025-2050 world in which nuclear weapons are still necessary. The report highlights and addresses the current deficit in national security attention paid to the continued relevance and importance of U.S. nuclear strategy and force posture, provides a new open-source baseline for understanding the nuclear strategies of other countries, and offers a credible, intellectually tested, and nonpartisan range of options for the United States to consider in revising its own nuclear strategy.


Technology innovations in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) have delivered unmatched national security capability for the United States for the greater part of the last seven decades. Federal research and development funding is at the heart of the U.S. high-technology advantage. Continuing to push the technology envelope is central to maintaining U.S. preeminence in military capability. As Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter made clear in his Silicon Valley speech in April 2015, "threats to our security and our country's technological superiority are proliferating and diversifying." The U.S. global lead in defense technology is being actively eroded by potential competitors who themselves are pursuing advanced technologies to develop asymmetric capabilities that challenge the U.S. ability to carry out critical missions. This report explores the context of the global innovation environment that is driving the need for DoD to better connect with the global commercial economy. Through an expansive set of interviews with experts, practitioners, and senior officials, the CSIS study team developed a set of recommendations, divided here into two general proposals: (1) encourage better awareness of outside innovation; and (2) enable better access to that outside innovation once it has been identified.

In recent years, it has become increasingly clear to many observers that the Department of Defense must better communicate to the officers at the tactical end of the nuclear mission a rationale for nuclear weapons and deterrence, the critical role that they play in the post-Cold War strategy of the United States, and the value of nuclear weapons to the security of the American people. This report tracks the changing conceptual and political landscape of U.S. nuclear deterrence to illuminate the gap in prioritizing the nuclear arsenal and to build a compelling rationale for tactical personnel explaining the role and value of U.S. nuclear weapons.

Missile Defense 2020

by Thomas Karako and Ian Williams

Published 18 April 2017
In policy pronouncements over the last two administrations, the protection of the American homeland was regularly identified as the first priority of U.S. missile defense efforts. Homeland missile defense today is provided by the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program and other elements of the larger Ballistic Missile Defense System. The limited defenses fielded today have advanced considerably since limited defensive operations began in late 2004, but nevertheless they remain too limited and too modest relative to emerging threats. The Missile Defense Agency's path to improve the system may require additional effort to stay ahead of even limited missile threats. This report explains how the current system works, as well as current and potential plans to modernize the system, and the authors offer recommendations for future evolution of the system.

Can contemporary arms control keep pace with the rapid rate of change in both geopolitics and technology? While the challenges to future arms control point to a rocky road ahead, measures that build confidence, reduce miscalculation, enhance transparency, restrain costly and dangerous military competition, and offer useful mechanisms and venues for addressing sources of conflict will be of increasing value. For arms control tools to succeed, however, they must be adapted to the current security environment, account for rapidly evolving technological and informational factors, and consider alternative structures, modalities, and participation models. Indeed, now is the time for a recoupling of arms control with deterrence in a way that recognizes these new realities. Now is the time for integrated arms control that enhances stability, embraces plurality, and reinforces resiliency. This CSIS study examines the implication and prospects for the future of arms control in a highly competitive security environment in which challenges from advanced technologies and diminished state control over processes of verification become increasingly prominent features, even as the scope and modalities of arms control grow more complex and multifaceted. The report offers a reexamination of the broad contours of arms control and its role in managing competitive security risks and challenges and the implications for U.S. policymakers, academics, and strategic thinkers engaged in U.S. nuclear policy.