Theory and Decision Library C

2 primary works

Economic Exchange and Social Organization

by Robert P Gilles

Published 30 September 1996

This book aims to develop an institutional approach to general economic equi librium. Thus far, institutional economics has essentially been confined to purely verbal discourse. Here I argue the case that general equilibrium theory forms a well rounded basis for the development of an institutional economic the ory. The fundamental economic trade mechanism underlying this refocusing is that of the Edgeworthian barter mechanism modelled through the equilibrium notion of the core of an economy. There is an extensive literature that links the core with the Walrasian price mechanism, which is explored in this book. Next I develop an alternative model of explicitly nonsovereign trade in the setting of an institutionally structured economy. In this book the core and several of its extensions are considered to be descriptions of the equilibrium allocations resulting from institutionalized barter processes, thereby providing a basis of an institutionally based economic theory. Traditionally finite economies have been assessed as the most natural represen tations of real life economies, in particular of market economies. Many funda mental insights have been developed. In the first half of the book I summarize the most influential and important results in the literature on finite economies regarding the relationship of the Walrasian model of a perfectly competitive market system and the Edgeworthian theory of individually based, pure barter processes. I use the axiomatic method as the main methodological framework according to which I construct my models.

The Cooperative Game Theory of Networks and Hierarchies

by Robert P Gilles

Published 21 April 2010

The book brings together an overview of standard concepts in cooperative game theory with applications to the analysis of social networks and hierarchical authority organizations. The standard concepts covered include the multi-linear extension, the Core, the Shapley value, and the cooperative potential. Also discussed are the Core for a restricted collection of formable coalitions, various Core covers, the Myerson value, value-based potentials, and share potentials. Within the context of social networks this book discusses the measurement of centrality and power as well as allocation rules such as the Myerson value and hierarchical allocation rules. For hierarchical organizations, two basic approaches to the exercise of authority are explored; for each approach the allocation of the generated output is developed. Each chapter is accompanied by a problem section, allowing this book to be used as a textbook for an advanced graduate course on game theory.