In this interpretation of the McKinley presidency Lewis L. Gould contends that William McKinley was the first modern president. Making use of extensive original research in manuscript collections in the United States, Great Britain, and France, Gould argues that during McKinley's four and a half years in the White House the executive office began to resemble the institution as the twentieth century would know it. He rejects the erroneous stereotypes that have long obscured McKinley's historical significance: McKinley as the compliant agent of Mark Hanna or as an irresolute executive in the Cuban crisis that led to war with Spain. He contends that McKinley is an important figure in the history of the United States because of the large contributions he made to the strengthening and broadening of the power of the chief executive.

While this volume touches on many aspects of McKinley's leadership, the core of it relates to the coming of the Spanish-American War, the president's conduct of the war itself, and the emergence of an American empire from 1898 to 1900. According to Gould, the Spanish-American War was not the result presidential weakness or of cowardice before public hysteria. McKinley sought to persuade Spain to relinquish Cuba peacefully, turning to war only when it became apparent that Madrid would never acquiesce.

During the war, McKinley effectively directed the American military effort and the diplomacy that brought territorial acquisitions and peace. The process of making peace with Spain--involving, as it did, American annexation of the Philippines--and of securing the ratification of the resulting treaty in the Senate underscored McKinley's expansive view of presidential power. He functioned as chief diplomat, from the sending of senators on the peace commission to the personal supervision of the terms of the negotiation. At home he made tours of the West and South in 1898 to lead popular opinion to his position as no president had done before him. For the Senate he evidenced a readiness to dispense patronage, woo votes with personal persuasion, and marshal the resources of the political system behind his treaty.

Later episodes in McKinley's administration support Gould's thesis. In administering Puerto Rico and Cuba and in suppressing an insurrection in the Philippines, McKinley relied further on the war power and continued to shape affairs from the White House. He sent troops to china during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 without congressional authorization, governed the new possessions through presidential commissions, and allowed Capitol Hill only a subsidiary role in the process. By 1901 the nation had an empire and a president whose manner and bearing anticipated the imperial executives of six decades later.

Gould does not argue that McKinley was a great president. He maintains, instead, that what McKinley contributed to the office, the examples he offered and the precedents he set make him an important figure in the emergence of the modern presidency in this century.


First published in 1991, The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt has won acclaim as a lucid and thorough narrative of Roosevelt's two terms in the White House. Reviewers praised the depth of Lewis L. Gould's research, his comprehensive coverage of major aspects of Roosevelt's tenure, and the persuasiveness of his conclusions about his subject's personalized presidency. Writing in Reviews in American History, Willard Gatewood called the book "essential reading for all who wish to understand the complex, charismatic, and perennially fascinating political figure that was Theodore Roosevelt."

Long considered the standard work on its subject, Gould's book is a trusted source that newcomers to Roosevelt's years in the White House and experts in the field could consult with confidence in its research and historical judgments. It has also become an essential adoption for courses on the era, effectively engaging undergraduates and graduate students who have praised the author for his clarity and evenhandedness. Responding to frequent suggestions that the book be brought up-to-date to incorporate the excellent studies of Roosevelt's presidency that have appeared since 1991, Gould has provided a new edition that he believes "will reintroduce a new generation of readers to the fun and importance of an ebullient, lively chief executive."

In this revised and expanded edition, Gould has built on the sterling qualities of the first edition and added new information and analysis based on continuing research and a command of the literature on Theodore Roosevelt's presidency published during the last two decades. He has tightened the prose and added numerous references to the latest scholarship on this most engaging of presidents. Interested readers will find new discussions of the origins of Roosevelt's creation of the Tongass Forest in Alaska, his treatment of a dissenting federal employee named Rebecca Taylor who took her grievance to the Supreme Court, the recent controversy over Roosevelt's relationship with Japan, the dispute over whether the president issued a warning to Germany about Venezuela in 1902-1903, and the important role of a little-known conservative senator named Winthrop Murray Crane.

With these and other changes, the updated version of Gould's text provides an even more compelling narrative that broadens the already fascinating story of Roosevelt in power with new insights and perceptive conclusions.

The only president to later serve as chief justice of the United States, William Howard Taft remarked in the 1920s that 'I don't remember that I ever was President'. Historians have agreed, and Taft is usually portrayed, when written about at all, as nothing more than a failed chief executive. In this provocative new study, the first treatment of the Taft presidency in four decades, Lewis L. Gould presents a compelling assessment of Taft's accomplishments and setbacks in office. Rich in human interest and fresh analysis of the events of Taft's four years in Washington, Gould's book shows why Taft's presidency is very much worth remembering on its own terms. Gould argues that Taft wanted to be president and had an ambitious agenda when he took power in March 1909. Approaching his duties more as a judge than as a charismatic executive in the mold of Theodore Roosevelt, Taft soon found himself out of step with public opinion. Gould shows how the Payne-Aldrich Tariff and the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy squandered Taft's political capital and prepared the ground for Democratic victories in the elections of 1910 and 1912. His seamless narrative provides innovative treatments of these crucial episodes to make Taft's presidency more understandable than in any previous account. On Canadian Reciprocity, Dollar Diplomacy, and international arbitration, Gould's well-researched work goes beyond earlier stale cliches about Taft's administration to link his tenure to the evolution of the modern presidency. Taft emerges as a hard-working but flawed executive who lacked the excitement of Theodore Roosevelt or the inspiration of Woodrow Wilson. The break with Theodore Roosevelt in 1912 doomed the Taft presidency, and Gould supplies an evenhanded analysis of the erosion of their once warm friendship. At bottom, the two men clashed about the nature of presidential power, and Gould traces with insight how this personal and ideological rupture influenced the future of the Republican party and the course of American politics. In Gould's skilled hands, this neglected presidency again comes alive. Leaving the White House in 1913, Taft wrote that 'the people of the United States did not owe me another election'. What his presidency deserved is the lively and wise appraisal of his record in office contained in this superb book.