This text argues that it was not ideological or national security considerations that led the United States into war with Japan in 1941. Instead, it argues, it was a struggle for access to Southeast Asia's vast storehouse of commodities - rubber, oil and tin - that drew the US into the conflict. Departing from conventional wisdom, Marshall re-examines the political landscape of the time and recreates the mounting tension and fear that gripped US officials in the months before the war. Unusual in its extensive use of previously ignored documents and studies, this work records the dilemmas of the Roosevelt administration: it initially hoped to avoid conflict with Japan but, after many diplomatic overtures, it came to see war as inevitable. Marshall also explores the ways that international conflicts often stem from rivalries over land, food, energy and industry. His insights into "resource war," the competition for essential commodities, should shed new light on US involvement in other conflicts - notably in Vietnam and the Persian Gulf.
- ISBN10 0520088239
- ISBN13 9780520088238
- Publish Date 20 January 1995
- Publish Status Out of Print
- Out of Print 23 June 2003
- Publish Country US
- Imprint University of California Press
- Format Hardcover
- Pages 296
- Language English